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Summary and Recommendations  
In 2002, the belligerents to the Second Congo War (1998-2002) signed a peace agreement 
that called for the merging of their fighting forces into a new national army, the Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). However, this process did not 
manage to end rebel activity in the east. While some factions refused integration, others 
deserted and reconstituted themselves as armed groups.  The primary response of the DRC 
government to these re-created rebel groups was to continue to try to integrate them into 
the army. Yet, rather than providing a solution, this policy has ushered in a vicious cycle of 
army integration and disintegration that has become a major factor in sustaining the 
ongoing violence in the east. Due to the close interconnections between the army, civilian 
populations and armed groups, army integration is not merely a military issue, but goes to 
the heart of the dynamics of conflict in the DRC.   
This paper analyzes the history, underlying mechanisms and effects of never-ending 
military integration. Furthermore, in order to provide more insight into the mechanisms 
and consequences of military integration, the paper discusses the general nature and 
workings of the Congolese army, including the causes of its weak combat performance. By 
firmly situating the FARDC within the Congolese state apparatus, it raises the question of 
how far an army can be reformed in the absence of wider reforms of the state in which it is 
mandated to serve. 
In light of the damaging effects of DRC’s past approaches to army integration, there 
is an urgent need to contemplate viable alternatives for dealing with armed groups. We 
suggest that these could include better designed and longer-term DDR programs, 
political and administrative integration of armed group representatives and local 
peace initiatives allowing representatives of civilian groups and communities to draw up 
viable plans for how to address armed groups active in their region.  
                                                     
1 This paper draws upon findings from two separate field-based research projects conducted by the 
authors. The research of Judith Verweijen is based on 13 months of ethnographic fieldwork on the 
FARDC and armed groups in the Kivus between 2010 and 2012, focusing on everyday civilian-
military interaction. The research by Maria Eriksson Baaz, conducted with Maria Stern, is based on 
in-depth interviews with over 260 FARDC staff in various parts of the country between 2006 and 
2012, covering a range of aspects related to military identities and civil-military relations. 
 
2 Maria Eriksson Baaz is Associate Professor at the Nordic Africa Institute and the School of Global 
Studies, Gothenburg University, Sweden. Judith Verweijen is a PhD Candidate at Utrecht 
University, The Netherlands. 
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However, given that yet another major wave of military integration is imminent, it is 
imperative to engage in efforts to mitigate the potential detrimental effects this would 
entail. To that end, the paper identifies three main, and intertwined, challenges. Many of 
the issues raised present deep dilemmas and we do not pretend to have any silver bullets in 
store. Furthermore, rather than providing a wish list based on unrealistic demands, we 
have tried to remain within the realm of the “somewhat possible.” With these precautions in 
mind, we suggest the following: 
There is a need to minimize incentive structures that reward violence, resulting 
from a skewed cost/benefit balance and the sanctioning of impunity, including:  
-    Addressing accountability. While prosecution of offenders and the initiation of vetting 
mechanisms should certainly be pushed for, experiences from previous integration 
processes, which have included neither, point to the need to think harder about 
alternative (and temporary) ways of addressing accountability. Such alternatives could 
involve including a truth-telling dimension into integration procedures, as well as 
removing commanders suspected of having committed abuses at least from day-to-day 
command; 
 
-    A conflict-sensitive design to pay-offs for integrating groups, including by prioritizing 
non-material over material pay-offs and identifying and regulating less violent forms 
of revenue-generation opportunities; 
 
- Designing more detailed integration agreements with clear timelines and credible 
control and sanctions mechanisms, including stricter conditions on integrating troops 
in terms of handing over arms and ensuring that all fighters are integrated, or 
otherwise properly demobilized. 
 
It is imperative that enkindling effects on intra-and intercommunity conflicts are 
mitigated. This would include efforts to:  
- Address political grievances each time an armed group is integrated, in order to 
ensure that there is also some integration-dividend for grassroots populations; 
 
- Ensure that there are credible provisions to maintain security in areas evacuated by 
integrating armed groups; 
 
- Redeploy troops to ensure a balanced geographical distribution, after fostering a basic 
level of trust.  The idea of localized or territorial security provision is an untenable 
solution, as it is bound to fuel more conflicts, given that most communities in the east 
live intermingled.  
 
Any integration efforts should avoid further destabilizing and disabling effects on 
the FARDC, in terms of unit cohesion, morale and performance, by:   
- Imposing a training period of at least three months on newly integrated troops, which 
should be part of a more long-term engagement, involving continuous training, 
refresher courses and collective drills, and a strong focus on lower-level unit 
commanders; 
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- Ensuring a balance in the composition and command of new units, with newly 
integrated troops not exceeding 25% in every unit and every commander being 
assisted by two deputies from different backgrounds; 
 
- Ensuring basic respect for meritocracy in the distribution of ranks and positions, by 
instituting tests and allowing the General Staff in Kinshasa to play a greater role in 
appointments in the east; 
 
- Engaging in serious efforts to address and mitigate identity-based tensions within the 
FARDC and their zones of deployment, by attending to this issue in training curricula, 
moral talks by army chaplains and sensitization efforts, for example through 
participatory theatre and radio emissions.  
 
Donor approaches to military integration have to a large extent been characterized by an 
ostrich policy, with little efforts to monitor and influence the unfolding processes. This 
reflects a more general approach to army reform, which is marked by shunning political 
issues, while at the same time accusing the Congolese side of “a lack of political will.” This 
rather simplistic narrative, however, fails to take a number of crucial issues into 
consideration, including the relative scarcity of allocated resources, Kinshasa’s limited 
political space for enforcing policies, the fact that “willingness for reform” does exist in 
substantial layers of the Congolese army (although it is unevenly distributed and 
fluctuating) and finally, the external climate where images of donor interests are deeply 
shaped by a long and troubling history of foreign intervention. 
While we do not believe in foreign-driven “social engineering,” and whereas efforts at 
army reform should take the overall nature of the Congolese state into consideration, we do 
believe that a more pro-active engagement in the domain of military integration can 
potentially contribute to mitigating its negative effects and open up more viable ways for 
dealing with armed groups. Given that army integration is a crucial factor in the on-going 
violence and conflict dynamics in the east, this should not be viewed merely as a secondary 
issue––but should be at the heart of donor engagement in the DRC. 
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Introduction 
 
Soon after the Congo obtained independence on 30 June 1960, its armed forces, from 8 July 
known as the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), fell apart into uncontrolled bands of 
mutineers. The ANC’s freshly promoted officer corps, which had replaced the Belgian 
leadership almost overnight, could not muster enough respect from their subordinates to 
contain the disorder.3 This rendered the disintegrating army susceptible to 
instrumentalization by competing political leaders and local strongmen. Thus, the 
crumbling army sped up the country’s political fragmentation, leading to the secession of 
two of its provinces, Katanga and South Kasai. Both established their own armed forces, 
while the ANC split into two competing factions.  
 
In 1963, this turmoil came to an end with the unification of both the country and the 
armed forces. Although the UN peacekeeping mission to the Congo, the Opération des 
Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) had advised earlier to disband the ANC and build a new 
army from scratch, it was decided to embark upon the arduous path of merging all armed 
factions into a single army. A number of rebellions that broke out the following year further 
complicated this task. Despite these difficulties, including divided loyalties and permanent 
power competition, the ANC eventually became a reasonably cohesive, albeit militarily 
weak, body. This allowed for a restoration-though temporary- of the basic sense of Congolese 
“national identity” that had characterized its colonial predecessor force. Only a faction of the 
re-integrated Katangan Gendarmes, constituting separate units within the ANC, eventually 
dropped out of the integration process and partly established themselves in Angola.4 This 
particular integration failure was connected to antagonism towards Kinshasa, a marked 
separate ethno-regional identity and close links to cross-border socio-economic networks. 
However, it was an exception in an otherwise largely successful integration project. 
 
Almost 40 years after the unification of the ANC – in 1971 rebaptized Forces Armées 
Zairoises (FAZ) by Mobutu – the Congo once again embarked upon the challenging path of 
army integration. This time the task was to merge the belligerents of the Second Congo War 
(1998-2002) into a new national army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du 
Congo (FARDC). While the contexts in which the ANC and the FARDC were formed are 
different in several aspects, some of the core ingredients of the ANC epoch have also 
characterized the strenuous development of the FARDC. Similarly to the ANC, the quest for 
control and cohesion in the FARDC has taken place amidst divided loyalties and power 
competition, involving groups with different ethno-regional and strong cross-border 
orientations. Moreover, integration has been managed in a situation of continuous 
insurgency and military operations.  
 
Yet, the management and outcomes of military integration in these different 
historical episodes diverge. For instance, the FARDC never received the comparatively large 
domestic and foreign resources that were invested in the ANC. Furthermore, the overall 
political climate, both national and international, diverges considerably. In contrast to the 
strong centralizing trend that was instigated by the iron fist of Mobutu, Joseph Kabila is 
                                                     
3 L-F. Vanderstraeten, De la Force Publique à l’Armée Nationale Congolaise: histoire d'une mutinerie 
(Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique, 1985). 
4 C. Young and T. Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985): 250-252. 
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working in an increasingly fragmented political environment that is subject to strong 
centrifugal tendencies. This has seriously hampered military integration and the 
development of a cohesive and effective army. Ten years after its birth, the FARDC still 
appears to hover between integration and disintegration. How can this erratic track be 
understood?  
 
In this paper, we situate the trajectory of the FARDC in a broader political and 
sociological context. This allows us to reflect upon a number of questions that are at the core 
of the eastern DRC security predicament. What are the main causes of the FARDC’s limited 
military performance and peculiar mode of operation? How did military integration unfold 
in the post-settlement era:  how was it shaped by and how has it shaped its political-
economic context? What were its modalities, and its effects on conflict dynamics in the east? 
Furthermore, given the botched record of military integration, are there alternatives for 
dealing with armed groups, or different ways to handle military integration? Finally, what 
role have international donors played in military integration processes up to now and what 
role could they play, especially in light of existing levels of “political will” within the 
Congolese government and the armed forces?   
 
The paper will proceed as follows. In the first part, we present some core features of 
the functioning of the FARDC, by situating it within the state apparatus of the DRC. The 
second part analyzes the dynamics of the military integration trajectory of the FARDC. This 
is followed by a discussion of possible alternatives to and different modalities of military 
integration. The fourth and final part addresses the issue of the scope for and 
characteristics of donor interventions in the context of political space and “political will” for 
army reform.  
 
 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE WORKINGS OF THE FARDC 
 
Any effort to comprehend the FARDC must be based on an understanding of the functioning 
of the Congolese state. Although the FARDC certainly has dynamics of its own, it is also an 
integral part of the machinery of the state, and starkly reflects the latter’s core 
characteristics. Weak capacities for policy implementation, the appropriation of public 
resources for private use, the drive for constant revenue-generation, often through extortion 
and with coercion, frequent rotations of office, permanent internal power competition, weak 
connections between the center in Kinshasa and lower levels in the provinces, and finally, 
poor service conditions of staff, in particular low salaries. None of these features are unique 
to the FARDC, or its predecessor forces, which to a large extent functioned in similar ways. 
By contrast, these characteristics have, for a long time, characterized most parts of the 
Congolese state apparatus, including the administration and the security services.5 This 
raises questions regarding the relation between army reform and state reform more 
generally: Is it reasonable to assume that one part of the state apparatus can operate in a 
radically different (better) way than the other parts, specifically when expected to still be 
                                                     
5 D. Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire, 
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1980); T. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle. Zaire in Comparative 
Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); M. Schatzberg, The Dialectics of 
Oppression in Zaire (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988). 
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subordinate and accountable to those parts? While we do not intend to answer this question 
here, we simply raise it with the intention of stimulating further reflection on this issue.6 
 
In the following, we will analyze the functioning of the FARDC in more detail, by 
highlighting two of its key features, which mirror the workings of the state as a whole. 
These are first, the influence of Big Man networks and second, the central importance of 
revenue-generation. Subsequently, we will reflect upon how these features shape the 
FARDC’s performance as a combat actor. 
 
The FARDC as part of the Congolese State Apparatus 
 
The Influence of Big Man Networks 
 
The FARDC can be conceptualized as a collection of different power networks that overlap, 
intersect, or conflict with the formal hierarchy. Hence, power projection does not simply 
follow the formal hierarchy and command chains. Many of these networks, which have 
varying degrees of internal cohesion and strength, are formed around Big Men7 or patrons, 
who are tied to webs of clients through relations of reciprocity. This implies that loyalty, 
support, and the provision of certain services are exchanged for access to revenue-
generation opportunities, (private) protection, and favors. Consequently, officers double as 
Big Men and do not only have the responsibility for their own troops, but also for a wider 
clientele both within and outside of the military.  Furthermore, every soldier, aside from his 
or her8 present unit affiliation, is tied to several other networks, for instance based on 
ethnic or geographical origins, past army unit affiliation or former armed group 
membership. 
 
On the one hand, this embedding into multiple networks extends the leverage and 
protection of FARDC staff.  It allows them to appeal to various sources for obtaining forms 
of social mobility and favors, for example, promotion, lucrative tasks, better functions, or 
exemption from prosecution by military justice.9 On the other hand, this jumble of power 
networks severely complicates military functioning. It makes everything negotiable and 
creates unpredictability and arbitrariness. Furthermore, through favoritism and the 
disregard of merit, it blocks access to good positions and revenue-generation opportunities 
for those “not having the right connections.” One of the main sources of unpredictability are 
                                                     
6 R. Egnell and P. Haldén, "Laudable, a historical and overambitious: Security Sector Reform meets 
state formation theory", Conflict, Security & Development, 9, no.1 (2009): 27–54. 
7 On the notion of Big Man networks, see M. Utas, "Introduction: Bigmanity and network governance 
in African conflicts", in M. Utas, ed., African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 2012), 1–31. Similar to Utas,  “Big Manity” is conceptualized 
herein as  a universal, socio-structural phenomenon that is manifested in contexts where formal 
governance structures are relatively weak. Hence, it should by no means be understood as  related to 
“African particularisms”or “tradition.”   
8 The amount of women serving in the FARDC is at present less than 2%. For a further discussion of 
female military staff in the FARDC see M. Eriksson Baaz and M. Stern, "Whores, men, and other 
misfits: Undoing 'feminization' in the Armed Forces in the DRC", African Affairs 110, no. 441  
(August 2011): 563–585. 
9 M. Eriksson Baaz and J. Verweijen, forthcoming, "La mère des armées n’est pas encore morte. Des 
pratiques de justice (in)formelle dans les Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo ’’, 
Politique Africaine, March 2013. 
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permanent power struggles between various Big Man networks.  Some of these are closer to 
the Presidential power circle in Kinshasa than others, and mobilize these connections in 
order to strengthen their position. These power struggles translate into frequent rotations of 
office, in particular constant reappointments and redeployments of officers. Another 
manifestation of this competition is the frequent restructuring of the military organization, 
like the 2011 effort to turn brigades into regiments in the Kivus. To a certain extent, these 
fluctuations in appointments, deployments and structures can be understood as attempts by 
Kinshasa to prevent a single power network from becoming hegemonic and too autonomous 
from the center.10   
 
A Focus on Revenue-Generation 
 
It is a common observation that FARDC staff, regardless their rank, spend a considerable 
amount of time on a variety of more and less illicit revenue-generating schemes. These 
income-generation activities also guide military deployments and activities more widely.11 
Rather than being purely the product of “greed” or the inherent traits of FARDC staff, we 
propose that this orientation must to a large extent be understood from the perspective of 
the workings of Big Man networks. The latter largely revolve around the granting or 
withholding of access to revenue-generating opportunities as a means of power projection. 
Another major factor contributing to the focus on revenue-generation are the limited 
(especially in relation to Big Men needs) official resources allocated to the military. In 
combination with mismanagement, this leads to very poor service conditions for the rank-
and-file. Soldiers’ monthly official income is around 70$, which is far from enough to 
maintain even a small family.12 Hence, as in the administration in general, most FARDC 
staff depend for their primary income not on their salary, but on revenue-generation 
possibilities linked to functions and opportunities that are mostly granted by Big Men. 
However, Big Men may withdraw this access any moment, specifically to avoid that their 
clients build up an autonomous power position or reduce their loyalty. The subsequent 
pervasive uncertainty makes army staff reap the benefits of their position as long as it lasts, 
which in turn feeds insecurity amongst those from whom they extract wealth.13  
 
One manifestation of these mechanisms of revenue-generation and power projection 
is the infamous system of rapportage, which can also be found in other state services.14 
                                                     
10 J.Verweijen, forthcoming, The Ambiguity of Militarization. The Complex Interaction Between the 
Congolese Armed Forces and Civilians in the Kivu Provinces, Eastern DR Congo, Utrecht University, 
PhD dissertation, forthcoming 2013. 
11 Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations 
Security Council S/2010/596), 29 November 2010, 48–49. 
12  Salaries went from 10.826 Franc Congolais (900FC = $1) for a soldier second class and 21.508 FC 
for a colonel full in 2006 to 60.018 FC for a soldier second class and 74.198FC for a colonel full in 
2012. Note that generals tend to receive only around 15$ a month more than a colonel full. Data 
obtained from EUSEC RD Congo sources. 
13 Schatzberg, Dialectics of Oppression. 
14 M. Eriksson Baaz and O. Olsson, "Feeding the horse: unofficial economic activities within the 
police force in the DR Congo", African Security 4, no. 4, (2011): 223–241; T. Trefon, “Public service 
provision in a failed state: looking beyond predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Review of 
African Political Economy 36, no. 136, 2009: 9–21. 
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Rapportage refers to the obligation of subordinates to pay prescribed regular sums to key 
figures in the hierarchy. These payments guarantee continued deployment in lucrative 
zones, such as near border-crossings or in areas rich in natural resources. This system 
works as an instrument of power at all levels of the hierarchy, as those failing to submit 
sufficient revenue, or otherwise fall out of favor, are being sent to, so called, “drier zones,” 
which have less revenue-generating opportunities.  
 
Given that Big Man networks tend to cross-cut civilian/military boundaries, civilian 
actors are also involved in these sometimes violent dynamics of revenue-generation and 
power projection, and not merely as victims. For instance, economic operators and 
politicians use the FARDC for facilitating their power projects and income-generation 
schemes, approaching them, for example, for protecting the transport of their goods, for 
obtaining, by means of influence-trafficking, licenses, permits, and reductions on 
import/export tariffs, for intimidating personal competitors or for establishing monopolies 
through coercion.  
 
At the same time, the weakness of civilian authorities, including police and justice 
institutions, prompts civilians from all layers of the population to turn to the military for 
the resolution of both more public and more private disputes. The disputes for which people 
solicit the intervention of the FARDC encompass a wide range of issues, such as conflicts 
around land, mining concessions, debts, inheritance, succession, love affairs, and personal 
rivalries. Certainly, these processes of military involvement in civilian dispute-resolution 
are not simply a question of civilian demand and military offer. The military also impose 
themselves in conflicts, sometimes with force.15 
  
The dynamics described above indicate that military functioning cannot be seen in 
isolation from the various roles that the FARDC plays within society. These roles far exceed 
that of the provision of security (or insecurity), but also encompass economic and 
governance functions. Yet, the FARDC’s security role remains a key discursive frame of 
reference and yardstick for how they are evaluated, both among domestic and international 
actors.  
 
The FARDC as a Combat Actor 
 
In the previous section, we have described some of the main characteristics of the 
functioning of the FARDC. Logically, these features shape the FARDC’s performance on the 
battlefield in important ways. As should be obvious, the workings and organization of the 
FARDC are not primarily geared towards effectively engaging in combat. Although the 
FARDC is in some contexts seen to contribute to civilians’ protection,16 this is often 
primarily related to their mere presence rather than to any active efforts to foster security. 
Activities like systematic day-and nighttime patrolling, strategic deployment and cordon-
and-search operations happen at a variable scale and with rather low intensity. In this 
respect, it should also be mentioned that due to deficient logistics and infrastructure, 
soldiers spend a large time of the day on extra-military tasks, such as fetching water and 
                                                     
15 J. Verweijen, “Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus”, Review of African 
Political Economy 40, no. 35, 2013: 67–82. 
16 S.Van Damme, "Commodities of War. Communities speak out on the true cost of conflict in Eastern 
DRC", Oxfam International Briefing Paper No. 164, November 2012. 
 9 
 
firewood, building or repairing their huts, or income-generation, either for their hierarchy or 
for themselves.  
 
In addition to distracting attention from combat, the weak institutionalization of the 
FARDC also hampers combat itself, specifically through irregular command structures and 
inefficient systems of logistics, communications and intelligence. Combat requires seamless 
command chains and a high level of coordination. Moreover, the military units involved 
need steady supplies of especially ammunitions, rations, medicine, and transport for rapid 
(re)deployments. All these components are weak in the FARDC, leading to confusion and 
disputes between units during battle, and troops ending up at the frontlines without 
sufficient food, shelter or ammunition. These malfunctions became unmistakably clear in 
the recent military operations against the M23, where troops were uncoordinated and 
quickly ran out of supplies17  
 
Another element reducing the FARDC’s combat capacity is the limited motivation to 
engage in life-risking behavior. This restrained enthusiasm to fight can mainly be 
attributed to two factors. The first is soldiers’ relative lack of material and non-material 
rewards such as salaries, pensions, housing, access to education, social status and 
recognition. Soldiers generally feel that neither the population nor the authorities recognize 
their contributions, which reduces their willingness to sacrifice.18 Secondly, primary unit 
cohesion, or the affective bonds that connect peers and direct superiors is generally weak in 
the FARDC.19 This further undermines both combat motivation and performance.20 As we 
will demonstrate below, these various combat demotivating factors have been seriously 
aggravated by military integration processes.  
 
 
II. THE FARDC’S ERRATIC TRAJECTORY OF MILITARY INTEGRATION 
 
In this section, we provide a brief historical overview of the various military integration 
initiatives and processes that were launched after the 2002 Pretoria agreement. This 
provides deeper insights into the mechanisms and effects of military integration, which are 
crucial for reflections on policy interventions and future developments.    
 
 
                                                     
17 F. Mumena, “Goma-incompréhension et colère des soldats Congolais”, Le Congolais, 24 November 
2012. Accessed 25 February 2013, http://www.lecongolais.cd/goma-incomprehension-et-colere-des-
soldats-congolais/. 
18 M. Eriksson Baaz and M. Stern, “The Complexity of Violence: A critical analysis of sexual violence 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)”, Sida Working Paper on Gender based Violence, Sida 
Stockholm, 2010. 
19 Verweijen, Ambiguity of Militarization; M. Eriksson Baaz and M. Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon 
of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond. (London and New York: Zed Books, June 
2013). 
20 E.g. E. Shils and M. Janowitz, “Cohesion and disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” 
Public Opinion Quarterly 12, 1948: 280–315; R. Little, “Buddy relations and combat performance” in 
The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, ed. M. Janowitz, (New York: Russell Sage, 
1964), 195–224. 
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“Half-brewed”: The Lukewarm Results of Initial Military Merging (2003-2007)21 
 
During the Sun City peace talks, the main rebel factions (RCD-G, MLC, RCD-K/ML, 
RCD/N22 and various groups of Mai Mai), agreed to merge their fighters into a new military 
structure following a quota system based on declared troop numbers. The creation of the 
command structures was to follow an intricate distribution key, based on the principle that 
each commander was to be assisted by two deputies from two different groups. This was to 
guarantee that all the different armed factions would be represented and that no single 
faction could control a part of the command chain. Furthermore, it was decided that no 
vetting processes would take place, allowing factions to integrate any of their troops and 
commanders, regardless of past behavior. While the final peace agreement contained an 
amnesty provision that exempted war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, no 
efforts were made to implement this clause in the army integration process.23  
 
Although the ex-belligerents reached agreement on the basic principles of 
integration, operationalization and implementation became a continuous bone of contention. 
This was already evident in the first step of integration, which involved the division of 
positions in the central and regional command structures. Each faction wanted to hold on to 
its former strongholds by carving out islands of control in the new command of the Military 
Regions, leading to parallel power structures. The next step - the recognition of ranks - was 
equally contentious. Whereas members of the more influential, bigger armed groups were 
able to keep their former rebel ranks, albeit with some minor adjustments, smaller armed 
groups, like some Mai Mai factions, saw only few of their higher ranks recognized. Only 
those with important connections in Kinshasa fared better in the process. Expectedly, the 
generous distribution of ranks according to political rather than merit-based criteria caused 
frictions between superiors and their often much better militarily educated subordinates. 
This phenomenon reappeared in later integration phases and continues to trouble the army 
up to today.  
  
The following phase in the army integration process consisted of the mixing of troops 
into new brigades. This process only started in 2004, and was very incremental, with the 
last Integrated Brigade (the 18th) ending its formation at the start of 2008. “Brassage” 
(brewing), as it was called, consisted of the mixing of fighters on an individual basis, 
followed by a training period of in principle 45 days. This training was not only supposed to 
instill basic military principles among troops with little conventional education, but to 
ensure that old loyalties were broken down and a unified chain of command established. 
Officially, the process had to mix combatants from all over the country, in order to ensure 
                                                     
21 For a more in-depth discussion of this initial phase of military merging see J. Verweijen, 
fothcoming 2013, "Half-brewed: The lukewarm results of creating an integrated Congolese military", 
in New Armies from Old. Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, ed. R.Licklider, 
Georgetown University Press, forthcoming 2013. 
22 See list of acronyms at the end.  
23 L. Davis, “Power shared and justice shelved: the Democratic Republic of Congo”, International 
Journal of Human Rights 17 no. 2, (2013): 289–306. 
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that the composition of the new Integrated Brigades followed the prescribed quota,24 and 
that there would be an even geographical distribution of fighters. However, these principles 
were not consistently adhered to. Not only was the process plagued by logistical, financial 
and management obstacles, it also suffered from manipulation by factions who were keen on 
maintaining combatants close to their former strongholds.25  
 
Refusal and Manipulation  
 
The military forces to be integrated were not stand-alone armed groups: they were integral 
parts of wider political-economic networks that had gained prominence in the course of the 
wars. Hence, the stakes of integration were very high, as both elite political and economic 
actors, as well as wider civilian constituencies, depended on these armed forces for income, 
power and a sense of security. Consequently, some of the ex-belligerents either refused to 
send their troops to brassage centers, or tried to manipulate the process. This manipulation 
took on two forms: first, factions prevented their integrated troops from being deployed far 
from their zones of influence; second, they ensured that troops were put under a different 
command chain.26 The refusal strategy was adopted especially by armed groups strong 
enough to persist outside the framework of the government forces, like a certain faction of 
the RCD-G that was tied into cross-border political-economic networks extending into 
Rwanda. Partly due to the RCD-G’s bleak electoral prospects, this group felt that military 
integration would bring them few benefits. Additionally, they referred to security fears 
among the Tutsi community in the Kivus, arguing that integration into mixed units would 
leave this community exposed. It was from the leadership of this dissident faction of the 
RCD-G that the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), headed by 
Laurent Nkunda, would later emerge. While Nkunda had been appointed General in the 
FARDC in 2003, he had refused to take up his new command position, remaining instead as 
a dissident in North Kivu. 
 
But the Nkunda group was not the only one to refuse brassage: several smaller-scale 
groups with only localized influence, like Mai Mai militia and some groups in Ituri, also 
dragged their feet. Furthermore, some who did integrate were profoundly unhappy with the 
results. Many of these disappointed groups lacked the high-level political and military 
connections required to obtain important positions, both in the central and regional 
command structures and within the Integrated Brigades. Given that it is positions, rather 
than ranks that determine access to (informal) revenue-generating opportunities in the 
FARDC, groups with little political and military weight were bound to experience a loss in 
influence, income and status after their integration. In many cases, the fact that they lacked 
qualified candidates also played an important role. However, we by no means want to imply 
that Mai Mai groups are, in the words of some observers, “untrainable” due to their 
                                                     
24 The official quota system for Integrated Brigades was FAC (35%), MLC (17%), RCD-G (28%), Mai-
Mai (8%) and other groups (12%). See International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the 
Congo, Africa Report No. 104, 13 February 2006, Brussels and Nairobi: International Crisis Group. 
25 See e.g. Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) and Reform of the Army, August 2006, London: Amnesty International; R. 
Onana and H.Taylor, "MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo", International 
Peacekeeping 15 no. 4, 2008: 501–516. 
26 S.Wolters, Update on the DRC: Is the Transition in Trouble?  ISS Situation Report, 20 July 2004, 
Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies. 
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“magical” ways,27 or that there are inherent “socio-anthropological limits” to the integration 
of Mai Mai combatants in the FARDC.28 Aside from reflecting stereotypes of “savage African 
warriors,” such assumptions ignore that supernatural and magical beliefs can be found 
among highly disciplined, “modern” and effective combat forces around the world.29 
Furthermore, military skills and competence are not primarily the result of prior education, 
but are produced by training and group processes.30   
 
However, training and education were hardly provided in the newly created army, 
with the result that less educated officers had little opportunities to improve. Rather than 
diagnosing their difficult access to higher positions as related to their lack of competence or 
importance, members from smaller factions often interpreted their marginalized positions 
as evidence of a deliberate policy of the systematic discrimination of so-called 
“autochthones” by the perceived Tutsi/Rwandophone31-dominated command of the new 
army. This experienced discrimination did not only reduce the enthusiasm of these groups 
to join the integration process; it also formed a reason to desert for those who did integrate. 
Many of such dissidents, when not joining armed groups, did not enter formal 
demobilization programs, but, “auto-demobilized,” meaning that they simply returned to 
civilian life without assistance, and while retaining their arms.32 Amongst those who were 
officially demobilized, many did not manage to develop sustainable forms of livelihoods-
generation. In this way, the military integration process produced a large mass of quasi-
demobilized and jobless ex-fighters, which proved a rich reservoir for new armed group 
recruitment.33 
                                                     
27 S. Melmot, Candide in Congo: The Expected Failure of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Focus 
Stratégique No. 9 bis, (Paris and Brussels: Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut 
Français des Relations Internationales, April 2009),18. 
28  T. Vircoulon, "Militariser les miliciens magiques? Les limites socio-anthropologiques de la 
militarisation des Maï Maï", in Réformes les armées africaines. En quête d’une nouvelle stratégie, ed. 
A. Augé and P. Klaousen, (Paris: Karthala, 2010), 131–147.   
29 For example, the US army chaplain’s handbook includes a section on Wicca since 1978, Wiccan 
gatherings are tolerated at US army bases, and Wiccan symbols are allowed on military graves. See 
e.g. “US Army says Wiccan work it out”, The Australian Times, 29 November 2011, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/us-army-says-wiccan-work-it-out/story-e6frg6so-
1226208546523; “US to allow Wiccan symbols on military graves”, Washington Times, 23 April 2007, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/apr/23/20070423-104939-6596r/?page=all) [both 
websites accessed 25 February 2013]. 
30 A. King, "The word of command: communication and cohesion in the military", Armed Forces & 
Society 32 no 4, (2006): 493–512. 
31 “Rwandophone” refers to speakers of Kinyrwanda, but has become a more ethnicized label to 
designate Hutu and Tutsi. Self-styled “autochthonous” groups have come to be antagonistically 
defined towards Tutsi/“Rwandophones”/Nilotics, with the object of enmity being contextual, 
indicating the slipperiness of the “autochthony discourse”. See S. Jackson, "Sons of which soil? The 
language and politics of autochthony in eastern D.R. Congo", African Studies Review, 49 no. 2 (2006): 
95–123. 
32 Verweijen, Ambiguity of Militarization.  
33 G. Lamb and others, Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War. Assessment of the Reintegration of Ex-
Combatants into Civilian Life in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Washington DC:  The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 
2012. 
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Ironically, perceptions of the nascent army as “partial” were not limited to 
“autochthonous” groups, but were shared by “Rwandophones”. This created two self-
enforcing and interlocking security dilemmas. Firstly, it made groups reluctant to send their 
troops into the army, as they believed their communities would otherwise remain 
unprotected. Secondly, the fact that some groups refused to engage in brassage became an 
important argument for competing groups to also refuse army integration. This nexus 
between inter-community dynamics and army integration has continued to this day.  
 
Mixed, Yet Predictable Results?  
 
With hindsight, the results of the first wave of post-settlement military integration can be 
described as mixed. In addition to leaving numerous un-integrated or only theoretically 
integrated forces on the ground, it created a favorable climate for the emergence of parallel 
command structures and power networks within the FARDC. However, the eighteen 
Integrated Brigades that came out of the brassage process eventually became reasonably 
cohesive forces, specifically in the first years after their formation. Therefore, rather than 
calling military integration an outright “failure,” we describe its results as “incomplete”. 
Furthermore, we suggest that the mixed success of army integration was perhaps a key 
reason why the “transition”34– albeit exceedingly fragile– did not fall apart.35  While the 
incomplete nature of the military integration process had various unfortunate effects, such 
as the clashes between Bemba’s troops and the Presidential Guard in Kinshasa in March 
2007,36 it is unlikely that the ex-belligerents would have stayed committed to the 
“transition” if they had been pressurized to give up their entire military structures and 
economic and political spheres of influence overnight. It was precisely through the half-
baked nature of army integration that factions could maintain the levels of economic, 
physical and political security required to remain somewhat committed to the process.  
 
This draws attention to the questions of political space and the feasibility of policies 
in light of a complex political, economic and military constellation. Without arguing that the 
outcomes of the “transition” were a foregone conclusion, we believe they should be seen in 
light of “structured contingency,” with political actors moving within the broad parameters 
set by institutional continuities. These cannot be rapidly changed through social 
engineering, although interventions might generate a momentum that leads to gradual 
change. However, as we will demonstrate below, the space for such momentum withered 
away after the first elected post-settlement government took power in 2007. 
 
The Open Door Policy: Never-Ending Military Integration (2007-up to Present) 
 
The government led by Prime Minister Gizenga faced an explosive and fragmented politico-
military landscape in the east, which was flooded by several non-integrated forces, and 
                                                     
34 Following Raeymaekers, we suggest that the term “transition” is misleading in that it did not lead 
to a fundamental transformation of the political-economic order. See T. Raeymaekers, The Power of 
Protection. Governance and Transborder Trade on the Congo-Ugandan Frontier, Ghent University, 
2007, PhD dissertation.  
35 J. Verweijen, “Half-brewed”.  
36 T. Carayannis, Elections in the DRC: The Bemba Surprise, Special Report 200, Washington DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, February 2008. 
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numerous foreign armed groups, like the Rwandan-led Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). In the absence of a strong and cohesive military, the 
government seemed to hope that with sufficient negotiations and promises, brassage 
dodgers could still be enticed to join.  Hence, instead of formulating a clear end date for the 
process of military integration, all those refusing brassage were allowed to integrate 
whenever they wished. Serious efforts at military operations were only undertaken against 
the CNDP, who had by then emerged as the most powerful military threat. However, 
recurring military defeats meant that here too, the government ultimately resorted to the 
time-tested strategies of co-optation. 
 
In sum, Kinshasa adopted a policy of negotiation and co-optation rather than 
pressure vis-à-vis armed groups, which can be succinctly described as a “many-carrots-with-
few-sticks” approach.37 It allowed dissident groups to turn (threats of) desertion or the 
rejection of army integration into a bargaining chip, as each time they perceived the 
rewards to be unsatisfactory, they would simply withdraw. Furthermore, those who 
deserted had incentives to produce violence, as this would inflate their significance and 
guarantee them a better negotiation position in the next round of (attempted) integration. 
Hence, rather than punishing dissidents and deserters for their disobedience and the 
violence they had caused, military integration rewarded them for it.38 As a result, some 
(parts of) groups alternately deserted and reintegrated, each time trying to obtain more 
benefits, while also putting more conditions on their integration, such as remaining in or 
close to their former fiefs or not handing in their arms caches.  
 
Predictably, this approach had a detrimental impact on internal dynamics in the 
army, as the continuous (dis)integration of dissident groups stimulated the reproduction of 
parallel power structures and fuelled power competition. Furthermore, it weakened the 
boundaries between the army and extra-military networks, as the frequently 
(dis)integrating groups often remained closely connected to their local civilian constituencies 
or non-integrated armed remnants. This had important consequences for conflict dynamics 
in the east. As will be outlined below, the most notorious case of this “revolving door” type of 
army (dis)integration is the CNDP. However, it should be emphasized that this is by no 
means the only group that followed such a trajectory. 
 
The Difficult Integration Path of the CNDP 
 
The first attempt to integrate the CNDP into the FARDC was made at the onset of 2007, in 
the wake of a failed government offensive. Negotiations held in Kigali resulted in Nkunda 
agreeing to mix his forces with non-integrated FARDC brigades, a process that was labeled 
“mixage”. By integrating CNDP troops into the army, the government hoped to isolate 
Nkunda and gradually dilute his influence. However, the results of this exercise were the 
very opposite. The CNDP troops were not re-trained before being mixed, they were allowed 
to stay in their former strongholds, and were broken down only to the battalion level, 
enabling Nkunda to maintain effective command. Furthermore, Nkunda managed to 
                                                     
37 For a more detailed discussion see M. Eriksson Baaz and J. Verweijen, forthcoming 2013,"The 
volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse. Rebel-military integration and conflict dynamics in eastern 
DRC", African Affairs, forthcoming July 2013. 
38 K. Vlassenroot and T. Raeymaekers, "Kivu’s intractable security conundrum", African Affairs 108 
no. 432, (May 2009): 475–484. 
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expand his sources of income, by controlling the money destined for soldiers’ salaries and 
other official funds. This helped him to substantially increase the area under his control as 
well as the number of troops under his command.39 The CNDP’s sudden rise in power 
provoked a strong reaction among other communities, in particular the Hutu, Hunde and 
Nande, who joined hands to form an armed group named Patriotes Résistants Congolais 
(PARECO).40 Thus, mixage aggravated rather than mitigated tensions in the Kivus. 
 
Already at the start of May 2007 it had become clear that the mixage experiment was 
failing. Nkunda’s brigades operated autonomously from the 8th Military Region (North 
Kivu), and had initiated military operations not planned and controlled by the hierarchy. 
While the CNDP asserted that the problems with mixage were located “on a logistical and 
organizational level,” the DRC Government claimed that it was an “orchestrated failure,” 
arguing that Nkunda never intended to truly integrate his troops into the army.41 With 
hindsight, it is difficult to see how the modalities of mixage, boiling down to the integration 
of the government army into the rebel forces instead of vice versa, could have worked in the 
first place.  
 
Soon after the mixed brigades disintegrated mid-2007, a new round of major fighting 
erupted. Battle was again followed by talks, which were this time complemented by a major 
peace conference held in Goma in January 2008. This conference intended to regroup all the 
Congolese armed groups in the Kivus and led to the signing of a cease-fire agreement. 
However, due to the generous distribution of pay-offs, it could not escape the “rents of 
violence”42 syndrome that had characterized previous efforts to deal with armed groups. 
Smelling lucrative per diems and future positions in the army and administration, armed 
groups reinforced recruitment and multiplied. Thus, the outcomes of the Goma conference 
came to reflect Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers’ observation that “every negotiated peace deal 
in the DRC has been followed by the proliferation and fragmentation of armed groups that 
each wants a portion of existing power agreements.”43  
 
Additionally, the main military player, the CNDP, was by no means satisfied with 
the Goma process, leading to an unraveling of the cease-fire and renewed fighting. In 
September 2008, the crisis escalated again, with the CNDP advancing towards Goma. By 
early October, they also started to raise their stakes rhetorically. Bolstered by his military 
and PR successes, Nkunda now talked not only of defending the rights of Congolese Tutsi, 
but also of liberating the whole of the Congo. Faced with the weak performance of the 
                                                     
39 J. Stearns, "Laurent Nkunda and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP)", in 
L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 2007-2008, ed. S. Marysse, F. Reyntjens and S. Vandegiste 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008), 245–267. 
40 J. Stearns, PARECO. Land, Local Strongmen and the Roots of Militia Politics in North Kivu, 
London: Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, 2013. 
41 S. Wolters, Trouble in Eastern DRC: The Nkunda Factor, ISS Situation Report. Pretoria: Institute 
for Security Studies, 3 September 2007. 
42 D. Tull and A. Mehler, "The hidden costs of power-sharing: reproducing insurgent violence in 
Africa", African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 375–398. 
43 Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, “Intractable security conundrum”, 476. For more examples of these 
dynamics around the Goma conference, see Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, “Volatility of half-cooked 
bouillabaisse”. 
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FARDC, and failing to get external military support, Kabila was pushed into negotiations 
with Rwanda. Kagame, for his part, was under pressure after a UN Group of Experts’ report 
revealed substantial support from the Rwandan government to the CNDP.44 In the course of 
January 2009, during a series of meetings behind closed doors, it was decided that the 
CNDP would once more integrate into the FARDC. Furthermore, it was agreed that 
Nkunda would be removed from the CNDP’s command and be replaced by his Chief of Staff, 
General Bosco Ntaganda, against whom an arrest warrant had been unsealed by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2006. This created considerable resentment among 
Nkunda loyalists, who were however put under pressure by Kigali to integrate into the 
FARDC.  
 
On 28 January 2009, an integration ceremony took place at the Rumangabo military 
base, where CNDP soldiers symbolically changed their uniforms. A week earlier, joint 
Rwandan army-FARDC operations had been launched against the FDLR. These were 
followed by Kivus-wide FARDC operations under the name of “Kimia II,” supported by the 
UN Mission in the DRC, MONUC. For that purpose, a new operational command structure 
was created, parallel to that of the Military Regions of North and South Kivu. Once again, a 
fast-track military integration process was initiated in which around 5500-6000 CNDP 
troops45 and an equal number of troops from smaller armed groups were mixed with the 
FARDC into new brigades. The process did not foresee any vetting or training of the newly 
integrated troops, who were broken down to the company-level.46 Finally, on 23 March, the 
CNDP’s integration was formalized with the signing of a peace agreement with the DRC 
government. This paved the way for its transformation into a political party. 
 
As the DRC government had embarked upon negotiations with the CNDP from a 
position of weakness, it had to make significant concessions, which allowed the CNDP to 
dictate the terms of its integration. As a consequence, the group came to dominate the 
command of the newly created Kimia II structures, while also obtaining the leadership of 
many of the new brigades some of which were composed of 50-75% ex-CNDP troops. 
Furthermore, the ex-CNDP were granted privileged access to lucrative areas of deployment, 
like environments rich in natural resources or near border-crossings. Additionally, they 
were allowed to keep their arms caches and maintain, at least initially, parallel systems of 
taxation, administration and police in their fief in central Masisi. They also kept a number 
of non-integrated units there that were not under the control of the provincial command 
structures. Aside from a small contingent deployed to Orientale, and a few commanders 
with strained relations with Kigali who went to the west, all ex-CNDP troops remained 
deployed in the Kivus. This enabled them to extend their influence far beyond their 
traditional stronghold and build up a position of military dominance.47 
                                                     
44 Final report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, (United Nations Security Council S/2008/773), 
12 December 2008, 15–18. 
45 EUSEC figures mention a total of 17.587 integrated troops after the fast-track integration, yet 
there are many reasons to believe that around one third of that number were ghost soldiers. This 
became clear when the brigades were disbanded in order to form regiments in 2011.  
46 International Crisis Group, Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda, 
Africa Report No. 165, Nairobi and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 16 Novemer 2010. 
47 Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (United Nations 
Security Council S/2009/603), 23 November 2009, 45–57; Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
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The unbalanced composition of the newly created brigades, and their deficient 
geographical spreading, came to fuel inter-and intra-community tensions in the Kivus. In 
areas predominantly inhabited by “autochthonous” groups, political and military 
entrepreneurs reacted to the deployment of Rwandophone-dominated brigades with 
increasing mobilization, trying to reinforce their position and protect their communities.48 
Such entrepreneurs portrayed the ex-CNDP dominated FARDC as infiltrated and controlled 
by Rwanda. In order to galvanize support, they drew upon the “balkanization” discourse, 
arguing that the domination of the ex-CNDP formed part of a plot to secede the Kivu 
provinces from the DRC, thus paving the way for an annexation by Rwanda.49 In some 
cases, Rwandophone FARDC troops came to be associated with local Rwandophone 
communities, like the Banyamulenge in South Kivu, exacerbating tensions between them 
and “autochthonous” groups. This illustrates the ways in which tensions surrounding the 
composition of the national army often reverberate throughout the Kivus, where different 
communities live intermingled.  
 
From (ex) CNDP to M23 
 
The dominance of the CNDP came with high political costs for the Kabila government, 
already widely perceived as a Rwandan puppet, particularly so in the West of the DRC. 
While it did engage in efforts to diffuse CNDP power, these were largely unsuccessful.  
First, it tried to capitalize upon the divisions between the pro-Nkunda and pro-Bosco wings.  
Since these ultimately managed to find a working collaboration, this strategy failed. 
Furthermore, in the course of 2010, pressure for the redeployment of a part of the ex-CNDP 
out of the Kivus mounted, which was met with resistance. In 2011, a restructuration process 
was launched that transformed brigades into regiments, with the intention of breaking 
parallel command chains. However, this process was hijacked by the CNDP, with Bosco 
dominating the appointments in many of the new regiments. Hence, none of the efforts to 
defuse CNDP power had the intended effects. This was to a large extent the result of both 
disorganization within the FARDC and substantial complicity of numerous of its officers, 
who profited importantly from ex-CNDP-run business networks and rackets.50  
 
The high political costs attached to these failures, and the continued insecurity in the 
Kivus, were reflected in the results of the contested elections in 2011, as support for Kabila 
dropped substantially compared to 2006. Furthermore, while international actors failed to 
strongly condemn the manipulation surrounding the elections, Kabila nevertheless came 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Democratic Republic of Congo, (United Nations Security Council S/2010/596) 29 November 2010, 42–
46.  
48 For instance, Mai Mai leader “General” Janvier Buingo Karairi, located north of Masisi-centre, 
feared that the reinforced position of the ex-CNDP would lead to increasing land grabs to the 
detriment of his ethnic Hunde community.  Final report S/2009/206, 78; Final report S/2010/596, 
17. 
49 For a more detailed discussion of the impacts of military integration on local conflict dynamics, see 
Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, ‘Volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse'. 
50 J. Stearns, From CNDP to M23. The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo, London: 
Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, 2012. 
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under increasing donor pressure.51 At the start of 2012, in an effort to restore some of his 
lost domestic and international support, Kabila launched renewed efforts to crack down on 
ex-CNDP power. He announced new military reform initiatives, with plans for 
redeployments and changes in command, including the ousting of the ICC indicted Bosco 
Ntaganda. This intensified pressure, possibly in combination with other dynamics internal 
to the ex-CNDP and their Rwandan allies, triggered a new rebellion. The latter was named 
M23, after the 23 March 2009 agreement, which they claimed had been violated. In a few 
months, and with substantial Rwandan backing,52 the M23 grew into a major military 
threat, capturing the city of Goma in November 2012.  
 
The Prospects of Yet Another Wave of Military Integration 
 
In December 2012, the M23 agreed to leave Goma and to start official talks with the DRC 
government in Kampala. These dragged on until a split within the M23 in February 2013 
between the pro-Bosco and the pro-Makenga wing changed the dynamics. After weeks of 
internecine fighting between the two factions, the Bosco-wing was defeated, and fled in 
large numbers to Rwanda. In a surprising development, Bosco surrendered himself to the 
American embassy in Kigali, which facilitated his transfer to the ICC. At the time of 
finalizing this paper, negotiations between the government and the remaining part of the 
M23 (i.e. the Makenga wing) are still ongoing.  The government has presented a proposition 
which calls for a differentiated integration of the M23 into the FARDC. While the rank-and-
file and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) would be allowed to integrate en bloc, officers 
would be judged on a case by case basis. For both groups, those suspected of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, or the subject of national or international arrest warrants, would 
be excluded from integration. However, the M23 has contested this proposition, judged as 
unfavorable. In the meanwhile, the upcoming deployment of a UN Intervention Brigade 
with a peace-enforcement mandate53 has altered the imaginary military balance in favor of 
Kabila.  It now seems unlikely that he will agree to any deal that could be interpreted as a 
concession to the M23, thereby further reducing his weak popularity, before the deployment 
of the Brigade. 
 
Yet, while the integration of the M23 might not be imminent, the absorption of other 
rebel groups into the FARDC has continued.  While the government announced an official 
end to this policy in May 2011, and even disbanded the Structure Militaire d’Integration 
(SMI), the body charged with managing integration, the M23 episode seems to have resulted 
in a reintensification of integration efforts. This is partly related to fears that uncontrolled 
groups might team up with the M23, which has tried to forge alliances with groups all over 
the DRC.54 However, it also points to a possible strategy of “dilution” of M23 power, should 
they eventually be integrated into the FARDC. On 16 April 2013, a first convoy of 50 
supposed Mai Mai from Fizi was sent to the Nyamunyunyi military base in South Kivu for 
their integration.55 They joined 170 combatants of a Kalehe-based armed group called 
                                                     
51 Whereas Kabila obtained 77% of the votes in North Kivu and 95 % in South Kivu during the run-
off of the 2006 elections, in 2011, it were respectively 39% and 45%, in spite of extensive rigging. 
52 Final Report S/2012/843, 618.  
53 United Nations Security Council Resolution, 2098, 28 March 2013. 
54 Final Report S/2012/843, 19-27. 
55 “Sud-Kivu: début du regroupement des Maï-Maï Yakutumba pour leur réintégration dans les 
FARDC” Radio Okapi, 17 April 2013. Accessed 23 April 2013, 
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Nyatura who had regrouped there earlier.56 In the meanwhile, negotiations with a coalition 
of seven Mai Mai groups in Uvira are ongoing, while talks with groups in Masisi and the 
rebels headed by Cobra Matata in Ituri continue as well. While the outcomes of these talks 
are far from clear, it appears that the stage is set for more integration. 
 
 As demonstrated above, military integration has up to now proven to lead into a 
vicious cycle of military integration and disintegration. The most effective way to stop this 
cycle– albeit perhaps not entirely feasible at this point (as we will return to below)– would 
be to abandon integration altogether. This evokes the question whether there are possible 
alternatives to military integration. Furthermore, in case integration proves inevitable, 
what if anything, can be done to manage this process without reproducing the detrimental 
effects of earlier integration efforts? Finally, what position should donors take in these 
unfolding processes? In the following, we will attend to these questions by highlighting the 
most important issues and dilemmas of military integration, while providing some clues for 
donor engagement. We will start with providing some very brief ideas on possible 
alternatives to military integration, a question which clearly merits further reflection than 
what can be provided in this paper, given its limited scope. 
 
 
III. MILITARY INTEGRATION: ISSUES, DILEMMAS, POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
AND ALTERNATIVES 
 
Alternatives to Military Integration  
 
While putting an end to military integration is desirable, particularly so in the long run, it 
is important to realize that this is not likely to be a silver bullet to bringing peace, especially 
in the short term. In the absence of a cohesive, neutrally perceived army with strong 
fighting capabilities, armed groups might have enough incentives to continue their 
activities, even without the prospects of army integration. As long as there is no real serious 
military pressure, the economy and politics remain militarized, arms are cheap and 
omnipresent, fighters can be recruited without much difficulty and communities can be 
easily mobilized on identity-based rhetoric, armed group activity is likely to continue. In 
other words, putting an end to military integration is not a solution to violent conflict in 
itself, and will not resolve its other drivers. In the following, we provide a number of brief 
reflections on alternatives to military integration, addressing only the issue of what should 
be done with armed groups. This implies that we leave aside the much wider question of 
peace-building in general, which has been discussed in detail elsewhere.57   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/04/17/sud-kivu-debut-du-regroupement-des-mai-mai-
yakutumba-pour-leur-reintegration-dans-les-fardc/. 
56 “Les Mai Mai Nyatura et Raiya Mutomboki acceptent d’intégrer les FARDC”, Radio Maendeleo, 27 
March 2013. Accessed 23 April 2013, http://www.radiomaendeleo.net/les-mai-mai-nyatura-et-raiya-
mutomboki-acceptent-dintegrer-les-fardc/.  
57 For a recent discussion and recommendations on wider peacebuilding processes in eastern DRC see 
e.g. A. Bouvy, Ending the Deadlock. Towards a New Vision of Peace in Eastern DRC, London: 
International Alert, September 2012. 
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Differently Designed DDR? 
 
It is crucial to think harder about what forms sustainable demobilization– providing a 
viable alternative for groups wishing to lay down arms– could take. Up to now, the 
experiences with Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs in the 
DRC have been quite disappointing. One reason is that these programs have tended to 
reproduce at a small scale the same skewed incentive structures as military integration. As 
a participant in a study on popular attitudes towards DDR in eastern DRC commented 
“They first went out to loot and steal, and now they receive support through DDR. They 
gain twice while the communities suffer.”58 Furthermore, it has been concluded that DDR 
programs have had a limited impact on whether combatants really demobilize or not, since 
this decision remains largely in the hands of armed group leadership, who often dispose of 
extensive mechanisms of surveillance and punishment for deserters.59 But even for 
combatants who have been allowed to demobilize, the effects have been limited.  This is to a 
large extent related to the design of DDR programs, particularly their orientation towards 
short-term material benefits, to the detriment of attention to social and psychological 
processes. As highlighted by an evaluation of DDR programs in the DRC, the provided 
financial benefits and training usually do not provide former combatants with the 
possibility to develop sustainable livelihoods-schemes.60 Newly acquired skills cannot be 
applied in the absence of employment in that sector.  Lump-sums sometimes obtained after 
selling reintegration kits usually rapidly evaporate due to the repayment of debts and 
contributions to (extended) family matters, such as funerals, marriages and medical costs. 
Hence, while the provision of benefits may occasionally function as a trigger for the initial 
decision to demobilize, the longer-term positive effects are meager.61  
 
 For this reason, it seems that longer-term programs would be more likely to be 
successful. These could, for instance, run on a two-year basis, and include sensitization, 
professional training, the regrouping of ex-combatants in associations, and the provision of 
work, such as in the rehabilitation of roads, schools, and medical centers. Rather than 
providing immediate sums of cash, such programs could, in addition to some kind of 
monthly salary for subsistence, involve a component in which the participant develops a 
business plan and receives a final amount disbursed at the end. Whereas this is no 
guarantee for success, and has the obvious risk of creating incentives to join armed groups 
in order to benefit from DDR programs, such longer-term programs could sever the ties to 
life in the bush and the use of violence.  
 
Political and Administrative Integration?  
 
For groups with a political wing, transformation into a political party as well as integration 
of key leaders into administrations could be an option. However, rebel-to-party 
transformations after the “transition” have rarely been successful. Most armed groups in 
the east are too small and localized to become recognized as political parties, something 
                                                     
58  H.  Rouw and R. Willems, Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Eastern 
DRC, no. 30, Peace, Security and Development Network, 2010. 20. 
59 J. Richards, Demobilization in the DRC. Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control, 
Armed Actors Issue Brief No.1, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2013. 
60 G. Lamb and others, Rumours of Peace. 
61 Rouw and Willems, Connecting Community Security. 
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which requires access to a support base in several provinces.  Where they do manage to 
become accredited as political parties, they might still represent a constituency that is too 
small to get candidates elected, specifically where demographics work against them.62 
Furthermore, political integration should be instead of and not in addition to military 
integration. When the former armed wing of integrated groups dominates the local security 
institutions, the stage is set for coercion in order to influence voter behavior. The case of ex-
CNDP interference in the 2011 elections in Masisi is a telling example.63  
 
Another possibility for the inclusion of former armed groups into decision-making 
structures could be to integrate their members into the national, provincial or local 
administrative apparatus. Again, if this would not occur in a balanced manner, it might 
have serious drawbacks, such as creating power competition, fostering parallel influence 
spheres, and promoting the partiality of the politico-administrative institutions. Yet, 
political and administrative integration have potential advantages. For instance, it can 
allow groups to maintain their grievances on the political agenda and address them through 
high-level channels. Moreover, integrated cadres might exercise pressure on their wider 
networks, specifically former armed wing members and local communities, to respect the 
signed agreements. In this respect, it should be remembered that in many cases, powerful 
political leaders might have a greater influence on the life-cycle of armed groups than the 
commanders in the field. Customary chiefs and other local community leaders often have 
significant influence too, as they can convince community members not to be recruited into 
armed groups. Therefore, any strategy to promote successful demobilization as an 
alternative to military integration, must also pay attention to community-level dynamics. 
  
Provincial or Local Level Peace Initiatives to Deal with Armed Groups? 
 
While the 2008 Goma conference had serious drawbacks, the underlying ideas– to create a 
platform to voice and address grievances, promote discussions between groups in conflict, 
and search for common solutions– were constructive. Hence, it could be fruitful to again 
initiate such a process, perhaps on a provincial or territorial basis this time (including 
North Katanga, South and North Kivu, and parts of Province Orientale) while avoiding the 
same mistakes. This would imply that only civilian delegations are invited, composed of 
local authorities and representatives of civil society organizations and local communities. 
Moreover, no promises of positions or other pay-offs should be issued.  
 
Such an initiative should not only address conflicts within and between 
communities, but also focus on how to deal with the armed groups within their areas. In 
particular, they should reflect upon and develop proposals for how these groups can be 
convinced to lay down arms. This would imply, for instance, thinking about whether and 
how militias could be integrated politically, what security measures should be taken after 
armed groups disappear, and how their fighters can be demobilized, including through the 
development of DDR plans. Finally, such a process could address the issue of how to handle 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the perpetrators of such crimes, by 
                                                     
62 This is for example the case with the ex-Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF), accredited as a 
political party in 2011, after their armed wing integrated into the FARDC. 
63 Final report S/2011/738, 85–86; M. Gouby, “DRC army’s loyalties uncertain around election”, 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 27 January 2012, Accessed 25 February 2013, 
http://iwpr.net/report-news/drc-armys-loyalties-uncertain-around-election. 
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reflecting for instance, upon the desirability and modalities of documenting and 
remembering crimes and bringing justice to victims. Such localized initiatives would allow 
for a differentiated approach towards armed groups, each of which has its own dynamics, 
making one-size-fits-all solutions unlikely. 
 
Yet, however desirable an end to army integration would be, it seems not to be 
imminent. Although the upcoming deployment of the Intervention Brigade raises the 
prospects for increased pressure on armed groups, the expectations surrounding this 
brigade appear inflated. Given the political costs of casualties for political leaders in the 
troop contribution countries, particularly South Africa, it remains to be seen how proactive 
the new Intervention Brigade will be. Moreover, the brigade has a serious disadvantage in 
terms of familiarity with the difficult terrain in which armed groups operate. Importantly, 
more aggressive military operations risk having counterproductive effects, since they can 
enkindle inter-and intra-community conflicts. In light of these developments, it is possible 
that military integration will continue for some time in the future. Therefore, attention 
must be directed to how to better design and manage such processes, in order to minimize 
harmful effects. 
 
In the following sections, we will highlight the key issues that should be addressed in 
any future military integration processes. These relate to: 1) minimizing incentive 
structures that reward violence due to a skewed cost/benefit balance; 2) lessening the 
enkindling effects on intra-and intercommunity conflicts in the east; and 3) avoiding further 
destabilizing and disabling effects on the FARDC.  
 
Minimizing Incentive Structures Rewarding Violence 
 
As outlined above, a fundamental problem with military integration, as it has been 
implemented up to now, are the skewed incentive structures that it has generated, with 
army desertion and insurgent violence being rewarded, instead of punished. At the core of 
this problem are the low costs of integration (e.g. no need to handover arms caches, lack of 
military pressure on non-integrated remnants and drop-outs, permission to remain deployed 
in former zones of influence) vs. the high rewards (financial benefits, impunity for past 
crimes, high ranks, good positions and lucrative deployment locations). Moreover, the 
“demonstration effects”64 of military integration play an important role too, as each group 
who integrates sets an example for others, showing that violence and disobedience can be 
translated into benefits. 
 
However, given the FARDC’s limited military capacities and the political reality of a 
weak center, it is clear that few groups would be willing to integrate without significant 
pay-offs. Hence, a type of military integration that consists only of sticks and no carrots is 
not likely to be very effective. The question is then how much one can raise the costs and 
lower the benefits without deterring factions from integrating altogether, specifically when 
they are in a position of military strength? Let us start with the question of raising the 
(psychological) costs of integration through fostering a basic sense of accountability. 
 
 
 
                                                     
64 Tull and Mehler, “Peace and powersharing”.  
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Fostering a Basic Sense of Accountability 
 
The problems with impunity in military integration processes are well-known and have 
been the object of numerous campaigns by human rights organizations.65 Certainly, 
integration with systematic persecutions and vetting systems in place is the preferred route. 
However, previous integration processes have included neither prosecution nor vetting, 
demonstrating a strong resistance against these measures. In case this resistance cannot be 
trounced alternative ways of addressing accountability– at least temporarily– should be 
considered. One such possible mechanism could be to include a truth-telling dimension into 
integration procedures, at least for those suspected of less grave offenses. Such a mechanism 
can only be applied after prior research and consultations among victims, communities and 
other stakeholders, who should be implicated in its design. Even when not leading to 
persecutions, this would imply at least an official recognition from the side of the DRC 
government that crimes have been committed, and therefore would constitute a modest 
improvement in comparison to the long-standing policy of impunity. However, truth-telling 
is in itself not likely to satisfy victims or contribute to reconciliation, as experiences from 
elsewhere have demonstrated.66 Therefore, additional measures for victims and 
communities are needed.  
 
Despite the limited benefits for victims, we believe that including a truth-telling 
dimension into integration procedures would be useful in that it could foster some sense of 
accountability and signal “new beginnings” among those subjected to it (that is, the 
suspected perpetrators). Being confronted with allegations of past abuses, ideally in a 
process also involving army chaplains, might be considered as a form of rite de passage, 
heralding the transition to the government army. In combination with training and 
education, this could possibly contribute to a reinforced commitment to professional values, 
and strengthen combatants’ identification with their new institution. Until now, army 
integration has been accompanied only by minimal ceremonies or other attention to 
psychological processes. This has lowered the threshold for military to desert, as integrated 
soldiers feel only weakly connected to the FARDC.  
 
Clearly, truth telling instead of persecutions should be avoided in relation to the 
worst offenders, particularly those in senior positions. If for whatever reason such figures 
would be exempted from judicial action it is crucial that they are at least removed from the 
day-to-day command of the army, especially within and around their former spheres of 
influence.  
    
 
 
                                                     
65 For instance, Human Rights Watch is engaged in continuous advocacy efforts to apprehend senior 
commanders of the M23 and FARDC. See “DR Congo: war crimes by M23, Congolese army. Response 
to crisis in east should emphasize justice.” Human Rights Watch, 5 February 2013, Accessed 15 
March 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/05/dr-congo-war-crimes-m23-congolese-army. 
66 E.g. on Sierra Leone see, R. Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Lessons 
from Sierra Leone. Special report 130, Washington DC: United States Institute on Peace, February 
2005; G. Millar, "Local evaluations of justice through truth telling in Sierra Leone: Postwar needs 
and transitional justice", Human Rights Review 12 no. 4, (2011): 515–535. 
 24 
 
Promoting Conflict-Sensitive Pay-Offs  
 
As concluded above, in the absence of effective military pressure or more comprehensive 
political processes, pay-offs have been the main way for convincing groups to stop insurgent 
activity. Pay-offs have usually been material and self-financing, taking the form of 
deployment in lucrative zones and tolerance for corruption, such as allowing the 
manipulation of biometric identification in order to inflate the payroll. A major set-back of 
this (unofficial) policy has been the pushing out of established economic networks and the 
fuelling of power competition, leading to instability both within the army and within the 
zones that are the object of economic competition. Although the involvement of the military 
in revenue-generation activities is clearly undesirable, we believe that in the current 
circumstances, a zero-tolerance policy is not feasible. This is particularly true as long as the 
general workings of the state apparatus do not change and official salaries do not reach 
levels that allow for sustaining a family.  
 
Therefore, it is urgent that the DRC government develops strategies to ensure pay-
offs to integrated groups that do not fuel further destabilization. This could imply, for 
example, focusing more on non-material pay offs, like educational opportunities abroad. 
Importantly, there is a need to identify and regulate less violent revenue-generation 
opportunities that do not undermine local communities’ livelihoods, or bolster inter and 
intra-community conflicts. Furthermore, it is important to prevent pay-offs from becoming 
entrenched, giving the integrated groups so much financial autonomy that they would be 
able to create a parallel network within the FARDC.67  
 
Designing More Detailed Integration Agreements with Credible Control and Sanctions 
Mechanisms 
 
The ease, with which integrated groups can drop out or integrate only partially into the 
army, is a serious impediment to successful military integration. In order to mitigate this, 
more transparent and detailed integration agreements need to be developed. Agreements 
must have clear time-lines and specify the rights and duties of the signatories in detail. The 
majority of integration deals have been negotiated in an opaque manner with minimal and 
vague clauses, and no timelines. On the one hand, this has facilitated integration, as it has 
made it possible for integrating groups to dodge commitments judged detrimental to their 
interests. On the other, it has made the unraveling of deals fairly easy and has hampered 
enforcement (since there has not been much to enforce).  
 
Furthermore, within integration deals, provisions of control and enforcement need to 
be sharpened. It is recommended that strict conditions be imposed in terms of handing over 
arms and ensuring that all fighters are either integrated or properly demobilized. This 
would necessitate control and verification in the zones formerly controlled by integrating 
armed groups, in order to uncover arms caches and remaining combatants. It should be 
                                                     
67 However, where integrated networks manage to obtain hegemony in a certain area, usually 
accompanied by far-reaching economic control, a certain (but often temporary) stability might result. 
To some, such stability is preferable to constant violent clashes, even when leading to exploitative 
economic domination. For an example in relation to the 85th brigade in Walikale, see N. Garrett, S. 
Sergiou and K. Vlassenroot, "Negotiated peace for extortion: The case of Walikale Territory in 
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contemplated in how far outsiders, like MILOBS (UN Military Observers) can play a role in 
such verification mechanisms. 
 
Reducing Enkindling Effects on Intra-and Intercommunity Conflicts in the East 
 
One of the central propositions of this report is that military integration in eastern DRC is 
not merely a military issue, but goes to the heart of conflict dynamics. This has been 
illustrated by the effects of CNDP integration, which provoked the mobilization of other 
armed groups and fuelled inter-community tensions. Given that eastern DRC is a 
kaleidoscope of numerous armed groups that are closely linked to communities with tense 
relations, military integration tends to trigger chains of reactions that sometimes go in 
unanticipated directions. This implies that any military integration exercise must take the 
potential effects on conflict dynamics into consideration.  
 
Addressing Political and Other Grievances in addition to Military Demands 
 
Even though not all armed groups have a political wing, most of them do voice grievances, 
often linked to certain communities or the areas where they are active. In some cases, 
military integration goes along with political negotiations, yet most of the time this amounts 
to little and is not anchored in agreements, or the clauses of such agreements are never 
implemented. Clearly, the mere integration of military leaders and their troops will do little 
to address the grievances of the wider communities they are connected to, and which they 
sometimes rhetorically pretend to represent. Therefore, it is extremely important to address 
political and other grievances each time an armed group is integrated and to try to ensure 
that there is some integration-dividend for grassroots populations. This has the added value 
of making it more difficult for military entrepreneurs to mobilize these populations in case 
they are dissatisfied with the results of integration processes.68 
 
The Sequencing, Balancing & Handling of the Integration of Armed Groups 
 
Given the multiplicity of armed groups in the east, there is a need to reflect upon whether 
they should be integrated all at the same time or sequentially. On the one hand, integrating 
a single group is bound to provoke reactions of enmity, fear or emulation, and reinforce the 
imagery of the FARDC as partial. On the other hand, integrating multiple groups 
simultaneously is both technically difficult to manage and might create the additional 
problem of fuelling tensions within the army. This was demonstrated by the 2009 
integration episode, when all groups demanded the preferential treatment given to the 
CNDP. Although there do not appear to be clear-cut solutions, given the heterogeneity of 
armed groups, we do recommend that any integration effort must reflect upon its impact on 
other armed groups.   
 
Another crucial issue of concern is the deployment and concentration of troops. Ever 
since the Sun City talks, the issue of autonomous local spheres of influence has been on the 
table, as well as the feasibility of integrating officers into the army who would rather serve 
in a provincial rather than the national army. It is important to emphasize that in our 
analysis, this problem plays more in relation to officers than the rank-and-file, many of 
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whom are willing to serve anywhere in the country.69 Furthermore, a distinction should be 
made between the first phase of integration and later phases, especially since it is 
understandable that initially, trust needs to be fostered (see next section for further 
elaboration). However, in the longer term, the issue of geographical distribution is inevitable. 
The idea of localized or territorial security mechanism, rather than national security 
institutions, is an untenable solution. Given that all communities live intermingled in the 
Kivus, such a solution is bound to fuel more conflicts. The history of the armed forces in 
Congo has amply demonstrated that a policy of the systematic geographical spreading and 
mixing of troops from different backgrounds is not only possible, but may have the 
additional effect of strengthening a sense of national, rather than regional or ethnic 
identity, in the armed forces. 
 
However, any policy aiming at the balanced geographical spreading of troops must 
pay due attention to provisions to maintain security in areas evacuated by armed groups. 
The distrust between communities, but also the political and economic competition between 
networks whose strength is based on their capacity to mobilize force, means that groups are 
reluctant to redeploy their troops out of their sphere of influence. Logically, groups linked to 
communities facing (perceived) direct threats from other Congolese or foreign armed groups 
will only be motivated to leave their fiefs if these threats are neutralized, or if a credible and 
neutral force will be deployed in their absence.   
 
Avoiding Further Destabilizing and Disabling Effects on the FARDC 
 
The followed path of FARDC military integration, in particular the 2009 process, has had 
serious detrimental effects on what in military-sociological language is termed horizontal 
cohesion (bonding between troops of similar ranks within the primary combat unit) and  
vertical cohesion (bonding between troops and their  superiors). Both these forms of 
cohesion are identified as important for combat motivation, performance and norm-
enforcement in armed forces.70 The main cohesion-undermining aspects of military 
integration processes in the DRC are the lack of retraining and redeployment of troops, the 
unbalanced composition of units, and the distribution of ranks and positions with disregard 
for merit. These factors are, in turn, both a cause and a consequence of the failure to break 
down the integrated group as a separate power network, leading to parallel command 
chains and systematic favoritism. This does not only undermine centralized command and 
control, but also provokes heavy resentment among troops.  
 
Within the FARDC, the power competition generated by the CNDP integration in 
2009 was interpreted primarily through an identity-based lens, leading to the reproduction 
of a very pronounced “autochthon”/Rwandophone division.71  Within the FARDC in the 
Kivus, “autochthones,” especially ex-Mai Mai and soldiers from the west, perceive real 
discrimination, specifically in the command structures.72 They feel systematically 
                                                     
69 Verweijen, Ambiguity of Militarization. 
70 G. Siebold, "The essence of military group cohesion", Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 2 (2007): 286–
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71 For more details see Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, “Volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse”.  
72 Ex-CNDP officers were appointed to 36% of the command positions in North Kivu, with 
government officers receiving 48%. However, at least 60% of the government appointees were from 
the ex-RCD, which was dominated by Tutsi and Hutu. See Final report, S/2011/738, 82. 
 27 
 
disadvantaged in the distribution of positions and functions, and subjected to unjust and 
unfair treatment in relation to informal and formal punitive actions and disciplining. As we 
have seen, this often becomes a rationale to desert. However, Rwandophone troops in the 
FARDC also fear discrimination, and are even haunted by the specter of prosecution. These 
fears go back a long time in history. Many Rwandophone communities have bad memories 
of biased FAZ behavior in the 1990s, but also vividly remember the massacres of Tutsi 
troops by their colleagues in the national army in August 1998, at the outbreak of the RCD 
rebellion.73 Additionally, it should be considered that in the wake of the M23 rebellion, the 
government has invested substantially in propaganda to promote national unity. These 
messages have urged the population to “show solidarity with their brothers and sisters in 
the east” and appealed to young, literate, single citizens to join the FARDC through 
nationwide recruitment campaigns. While this new recruitment has produced rather 
disappointing results, and while the campaign does not seem to be very successful in 
boosting Kabila’s corroded popularity, it has certainly further nurtured anti-Rwandophone 
sentiments, also in the western parts of the country. This should be taken into consideration 
if M23 will be reintegrated. 
 
Clearly, the “autochthon”/Rwandophone tensions resulting from the 2009 integration 
further undermined both horizontal and vertical cohesion and were manifested in 
subordination. As can be expected, troops are less willing to obey orders from superiors they 
judge to defend only the parochial interests of their own ethnic group. However, ethnic 
background is not the only factor that has undermined vertical cohesion: both the rapid 
changes in leadership prompted by integration and the perceived lack of qualifications of 
the newly appointed commanders have had serious detrimental effects. Logically, 
commanders who are little respected due to their limited training struggle to maintain 
control over and loyalty from their (often better educated) subordinates.74  
 
Aside from corroding cohesion, integration has also sharply undermined morale. The 
continuous rewards to army deserters and insurgent groups have had profoundly 
demoralizing effects. Understandably, the propensities to excel and risk one’s life in combat 
sharply diminish when there is a great chance that the ones you fight will be welcomed back  
into the army, perhaps in an even more privileged position than before, and perhaps even 
becoming your new superiors.75 Another factor in undermining morale, which has also had 
implications for cohesion, is the distrust generated by suspicions of divided loyalties, 
especially where integrated groups have maintained close relations with remnants or allies 
outside of the military. One way in which this has been manifested is repeated leaks of 
military intelligence, making unexpected operations difficult. Obviously, to know that one is 
                                                     
73 For example, numerous killings took place in 1998 at the École de Formation des Officiers (EFO) in 
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fighting an enemy already warned in advance is very demoralizing for troops. However, 
subversion has not been restricted to leaks of information, but is also believed to include 
other forms of sabotage, like counter-productive orders from suspected figures in the 
hierarchy. According to several FARDC sources, these dynamics were evident in the 
military operations against the M23.76  
 
The various cohesion and moral undermining factors described above clearly need to 
be addressed in future integration efforts. Whereas several of the previous 
recommendations already partly cover these issues, we suggest the following additional 
measures:  
 
Firstly, newly integrated troops should go through at least three months of training 
not separately, but together with the new units where they will be placed. This training 
should focus on collective drills and exercises, in particular involving lower-level 
commanders (section, platoon, company). Such exercises are crucial in fostering task 
cohesion, the development of shared systems of communication, and the socialization of 
troops into standard leadership procedures, which are all important elements for effective 
military performance and maintaining discipline.77 Furthermore, it must be recognized that 
the effects of isolated training are quite limited, pointing to the need for continuous training 
and refresher courses.  
 
 Secondly, there must be a balance in the composition of new units. Ideally, the 
amount of newly integrated troops per unit at every level (from section to brigade/regiment) 
should not exceed 25%. There should also be a balancing of command, especially in the 
crucial initial trust-fostering stages. Therefore, and following the system which was 
generally applied in previous integration processes, every commander at every level should 
be assisted by two deputies from different backgrounds. 
 
Thirdly, integration processes must reflect some basic respect for meritocracy. Even 
though it is clear that groups who integrate need a certain amount of pay-offs, and that 
favoritism will always play some role in the Congolese army, the violation of meritocratic 
principles in the FARDC has been just too blatant. For this reason, it is urgent to restore a 
modicum of (a sense of) meritocracy, for instance by initiating tests at the end of the 
proposed three month training period. Moreover, it would be beneficial if the General Staff 
in Kinshasa takes up a more direct and proactive role in making appointments in the east.78 
 
Finally, there is an urgent need to address identity-based tensions within and outside 
the FARDC. Given their deleterious effects on internal cohesion in the military as well as 
local conflict dynamics more generally, any deployment scheme will need to pay attention to 
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regiments.  
 29 
 
discrimination and prejudices, attending to all sides. Unfortunately, until now the 
initiatives to address this issue within the FARDC have been inadequate. Sensitization 
sessions, often sponsored by donors, focus commonly on general human rights issues or 
sexual violence-leaving aside the thorny topic of identity-based tensions, or only touching 
upon it superficially or in formal equality discourses. It seems therefore pertinent to 
mainstream attention to identity-based tensions in curricula, sensitization sessions, and 
moral talks by army chaplains, preferably in a creative manner, for example through 
participatory theatre and radio emissions 
 
As the previous sections display, there are many possibilities to either replace or 
improve military integration. This raises the question what role donors could play in order 
to promote these solutions. This question cannot be answered without addressing the wider 
debate surrounding donor engagement and the (im)possibilities of army reform in the DRC. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to evaluate what position donors have taken in the military 
integration saga up to now. In the following, we will first reflect upon these issues, in order 
to later come back to the role of donor engagement in military integration. 
 
 
IV. POLITICAL WILL, POLITICAL SPACE AND THE DONOR CONUNDRUM 
 
In this final section, we will situate the issue of donor responses to the cycle of army 
integration and disintegration in the wider context of the mechanisms underlying donor 
engagement in army reform. Hence, we do not intend to assess defense reform initiatives as 
such, but rather focus on the discourses and narratives surrounding external interventions 
in this domain, both from the perspective of donors and the Congolese army. 
 
One reason why we do not intend to assess defense reform initiatives is that the 
multitude of programs and the lack of data on their impact simply preclude possibilities to 
make serious, empirically grounded, judgments. Interventions in the sphere of defense 
reform have been carried out by a range of actors, such as the UN, the EU (through 
EUSEC),79 the US, China, South Africa, Belgium, Angola and France. This multitude of 
actors and the lack of coordination between them are commonly described as an important 
reason for “failure.”80 Yet, in the absence of data, we do not think that the narrative of “total 
failure” can be substantiated. This is particularly true given that assessments tend to be 
grounded in rather vaguely defined expectations, often measured against an overall 
judgment of FARDC performance, with little connection to actual interventions. 
Furthermore, assessments seldom take the balance between invested resources and 
outcomes into consideration. Between 2006 and 2010, just over 1% ($84.79 million) of total 
aid (excluding debt relief and excluding bilateral military assistance) was spent directly on 
the security sector.81 Additionally, while most bilateral interventions take the form of 
                                                     
79 EUSEC is a small in-country Security Sector Reform advisory and assistance mission from the 
European Union that has been deployed to the DRC since 2005. 
80 E.g. H. Hoebeke, H.Boshoff and K. Vlassenroot, Assessing Security Sector Reform and its impact on 
the Kivu Provinces, Situation report, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 26 November 2008; 
ASADHO et.al, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, 2012; 
Melmot, Candide au Congo.  
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training, only approximately six percent of FARDC troops have received specialized training 
by or under the supervision of foreign military personnel since 2007.82 
 
In addition to being based on limited, selective and normative assumptions, 
narratives of total failure are also problematic in that they tend to ignore the perspectives of 
the “other side” in “defense collaboration.” While FARDC staff are highly aware of the deep-
seated problems in their own army, they tend to hold different expectations concerning the 
scope and pace of reforms. From their perspective, the slow pace of defense reform often 
appears somehow logical in light of the meager resources allocated, but particularly given 
that reform is taking place in the midst of continuing conflict and the continual integration 
of combatants from armed groups.83  
 
For these reasons, we refrain from joining the choir of “generalized failure” 
concerning defense reform. Nevertheless, similarly to mainstream assessments of army 
reform efforts, we do contend that the ways in which external actors have engaged with the 
issue in the DRC are problematic. This is not the least reflected in donor responses to army 
integration, a theme which we will attend to below. 
 
International Responses to Army Integration 
 
Overall, international actors have exercised little influence on the contents of the various 
integration deals that were made since the transition. Most of these, like those surrounding 
the 2007 and 2009 CNDP integration, were negotiated in an opaque manner, with the 
modalities determined by a few key players, like General John Numbi, the former 
commander of the Congolese Air Force. Despite having a limited impact on shaping the 
contents of integration, international actors have generally welcomed the announcement of 
integration deals, thereby providing an impression of basic approval. Even the news of the 
planned military operations in the wake of the 2009 CNDP integration was positively 
received, and even garnered the support of the MONUC. However, anyone with a basic 
understanding of military realities in eastern DRC could have seen that the operations were 
bound to have dire humanitarian consequences, specifically given the lack of cohesion of the 
newly integrated troops. Yet, it was only after the disastrous effects of the Kimia II 
operations became fully visible84 that doubts were openly expressed about the way they 
were managed and about whether the ends justified the means.   
 
This reflects a wider trend of limited efforts to proactively and critically monitor 
integration processes in order to exercise pressure to adjust their modalities. Aside from 
limited technical and logistical support by MONUC/MONUSCO85, as well as assistance with 
biometrical identification by EUSEC, there has been little direct donor involvement in the 
implementation of integration processes. Certainly, the Congolese side, specifically key 
                                                     
82 S. Van Damme and J.Verweijen, unpublished, In Search of an Army. How the FARDC Can Improve 
Civilians’ Safety, Oxfam International policy brief, unpublished 2012, 10. 
83 M. Eriksson Baaz and M. Stern, forthcoming, “Willing reform? An analysis of defence reform 
initiatives in the DRC”, in Globalization and Development: Rethinking Interventions and Governance 
ed. A. Bigsten, (Routledge, forthcoming 2013). 
84 Human Rights Watch, You Will Be Punished”. Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, New York, 
NY: Human Rights Watch, 2009. 
85 The name of the UN Mission in the DRC was changed in 2010 from MONUC to MONUSCO. 
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figures and military advisors close to the President, has not been very receptive to such 
involvement, partly as they perceive this to be meddling in internal affairs. Moreover, in the 
case of the 2009 integration, they had planned immediate military operations, rather than 
training. However, apart from limited political space, it appears that donors have made few 
efforts to influence military integration processes in the first place.  We believe that donors, 
specifically those running bilateral military assistance programs, could have been more pro-
active in bringing integration issues to the table, for instance through efforts to impose a 
quota of newly integrated troops for the units they were training, or to build in more 
conditionalities into military assistance. It was only after the M23 rebellion was well on its 
way that public denouncements of military integration policies by diplomats started to 
proliferate,86 and media attention increased.87 
 
While it would be foolish to believe that a deeply political process like military 
integration can be stirred by merely changing the technical modalities, we do believe that 
concerted and well-timed pressure, as well as technical assistance, could have made some 
difference. Different inputs could have created a momentum ultimately leading to other-
albeit perhaps not radically different-outcomes. But these opportunities were not seized 
upon. Rather, external actors seemed to resort to a “let’s wait-and-see” attitude. There were 
several reasons for this meager attention to military integration. In the post 2009 period, 
the failure to put pressure on the Congolese government was linked to a fear to spoil the 
fragile rapprochement between Kinshasa and Kigali. Moreover, it was believed that 
pressure would be counterproductive, leading Kinshasa to marginalize donors even more in 
the realm of defense reform. 
 
However, the ostrich policy towards military integration must also be understood as 
a manifestation of the complex motivations to engage in Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the 
DRC. The impetus for such engagement is not only located in a wish to reform the 
Congolese defense forces; various political, diplomatic, strategic and economic interests also 
play a role. One manifestation of this is that the arena of SSR in the DRC has been 
characterized by quite fierce competition between the various actors involved–vying for 
visibility and over who is “to take the lead” in the process.  Following this– and the demands 
to deliver according to already established plans and budget lines–external actors, like in 
                                                     
86 The first diplomat to specifically and openly  address the problem of military integration was 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Didier Reynders, who brought it up during a visit to Kinshasa on 
20 August 2012; “Guerre dans l’Est: la Belgique appelle la RDC à réformer son armée”, Radio Okapi,  
21 August 2012, Accessed 26 February 2013, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/08/21/guerre-dans-
la-belgique-appelle-la-rdc-reformer-son-armee/.  
87 E.g. M. Gouby, “Congo-Kinshasa: Will Kinshasa go easy on M23 rebels?”, Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting, 15 November 2012, Accessed 26 February 2013, http://iwpr.net/report-news/will-
kinshasa-go-easy-m23-rebels; We experienced this rising interest directly through a hausse in 
requests from journalists and diplomats after our initial publication of some blog posts in August 
2012, see footnote 75 and M.Eriksson Baaz and J. Verweijen, “Harvesting the rotten fruits of 
repeated rebel military integration: some reflections on the new rebellion in eastern DRC”, Mats 
Utas’ blog, 3 August 2012, Accessed 26 February 2013, 
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integration-some-reflections-on-the-new-rebellion-in-eastern-drc-guest-post-by-maria-eriksson-baaz-
and-judith-verweijen/.   
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other domains of intervention, have a tendency to focus on short-term and quantifiable 
indicators of success. In the case of military integration, numbers of combatants integrated 
were often presented as “successes” rather than potential problems. Meanwhile, setbacks 
with integration, as well as the lack of visible progress with army reform more in general, 
have been blamed on the DRC governments’ “lack of political will,” an argument that we 
will turn to next. 
 
Political Will and Political Space 
 
One of the (many) inconsistencies in donor engagement in defense reform is that while 
donors fail to take “the political” into account when designing their interventions, they 
readily point to “the political” in explaining the latter’s disappointing results,88 specifically 
“the lack of political will” from the side of the DRC government. This narrative is repeated 
almost like a mantra in every analysis of SSR in the DRC.89 Certainly, the argument has 
quite some validity. Part of the limited progress in defense reform can be attributed to a 
moderate commitment from elements within the Presidential circle and the government. 
This especially concerns those who benefit from profits collected by military entrepreneurs 
in the east and those primarily seeking to instrumentalize donor aid, like key figures in the 
Ministry of Defense have been reported to do. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that fear 
for the regime-threatening potential of a strong FARDC contributes to a lukewarm 
commitment to army institutionalization. Nevertheless, we think that the “lack of political 
will narrative” is rather unsophisticated in that it downplays a range of crucial aspects.  
 
Importantly, analyses purely focusing on “political will” commonly ignore that the 
fragmented nature of the FARDC seriously hampers efforts of straight-forward policy 
implementation. Kinshasa’s control over the Kivus, and other parts of the country, has 
historically assumed more the character of “indirect rule” by means of power projection 
through intermediaries, than direct administrative intervention. This mode of governance 
has only amplified in the post-settlement era, when Kinshasa emerged as a quite weak 
political center.90 This is also visible in relation to the army. Not only have the number of 
competing power networks within the military increased, many of these are rooted in extra-
military political and economic networks with strong cross-border connections, rendering 
them relatively autonomous from the presidential Big Man network. These strong extra-
military connections imply that each time a group threatens to be marginalized within the 
military; they can resort to mobilization outside of it, or simply desert. Logically, this 
weakens Kinshasa’s room for maneuver. The multiplicity of competing factions within the 
army also complicates control by making the internal dynamics unpredictable. The number 
of action-reactions in the chain becomes so large that it is difficult for one actor to retain 
control or manage divide-and-rule strategies. In this context, it is not surprising that the 
possibilities for applying pressure are limited. Neither is it surprising that the main 
instrument for retaining leverage and pacifying power networks becomes co-optation by 
providing pay-offs. In conclusion, weak progress and disappointing results cannot simply be 
                                                     
88 Cf. D. Keen, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. 
89 For an analysis of these discourses and FARDC responses see Eriksson Baaz and Stern “Willing 
Reform?” 
90 K. Vlassenroot and T. Raeymaekers, "New political order in the DR Congo? The transformation of 
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attributed to a “lack of political will” alone. Any evaluation of defense reform must also pay 
due regard to the political space for implementation and enforcement.  
 
 A further problem with the “lack of political will” narrative is that it blinds external 
actors to the post-colonial dynamics that shape Congolese perceptions of their interventions, 
and how that in turn informs defense cooperation. Similar to other contexts of development 
interventions, there is a tendency to reduce the rationale behind all Congolese actions 
simply to “tactics” masking ulterior motives of personal or collective self-enrichment.91 
However, similarly to their donor partners, the Congolese government and defense 
establishment are driven by diverse, complex, shifting and contradictory interests and 
values. Furthermore and importantly, FARDC staff attribute the same motivations of 
“shameless greed” to aid donors that the latter ascribe to them.92 These views are informed 
by a long history of colonial and postcolonial occupation, military interference and 
mercenary activity, generally seen as the product of resource-hungry (Western) imperialist 
powers and their regional allies. Regardless of their correspondence to “reality,” these 
narratives are experienced as very real. Hence, they cannot simply be reduced to tactics of 
cunning manipulation while “feigning a simulacrum of dependency,”93 but should also be 
seen as nurturing a generalized mistrust towards external actors’ “real” intentions. In sum, 
while Congolese actors certainly strategize and act in a utilitarian manner– as do external 
actors– this does not necessarily render “political will” an adequate lens to capture the 
complex dynamics of defense reform in a postcolonial setting. 
 
 Certainly, resistance to reform can be found at various levels within the Congolese 
defense establishment, particularly so in functions controlling the flow of (access to) 
resources. However, “political will” is not a dichotomous variable that either exists or does 
not. It is contextual, shifting and variable, depending, amongst others, on agents’ positions, 
personalities and the “reform issue” at hand. For instance, resistance towards measures to 
improve financial transparency does not go necessarily hand in hand with a reluctance to 
sharpen mechanisms aimed at disciplining human rights offenders. Moreover, dispositions 
towards reform are often determined by shifting positions in Big Man networks, implying 
that the “champions of change” of today can be the “spoilers” of tomorrow. Consequently, 
evaluations of political will and political space need to be ongoing, and donors must be more 
flexible and adaptive in navigating these murky waters.   
 
Finally, it is important to highlight that whereas it is not difficult to find resistance 
to reform in the FARDC; our research findings indicate that “willingness for reform” is also 
quite substantive. Especially among the second tier of senior staff (deputy commanders), 
mid-level commanders, NCOs and the lower ranks, the dissatisfaction with the current 
functioning of the FARDC is widespread, as is the awareness that “things are not as they 
should be.” The wish for better discipline, clear chains of command, competent superiors, a 
system of promotion based on experience and merit, and fair punishments for those 
                                                     
91 For instance, as one Congo expert concluded recently, “Congolese mask reality and hide the truth 
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Congolese influence and often control their foreign partners.” T. Trefon, Congo Masquerade: The 
Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure (London & New York: Zed Books, 2011), 18.    
92 For a further discussion of these dynamics see Eriksson Baaz and Stern, “Willing reform?” 
93 Trefon, Congo Masquerade, 18. 
 34 
 
transgressing the military code are regularly articulated. Given the generally low levels of 
formal military (and other) education and training, this awareness is quite striking.94 
Furthermore, there is not only a desire to improve matters, there are also many ideas as to 
what needs to be improved and how. In fact, we found that many sector or unit commanders 
already take initiatives “from below” in order to improve the behavior of their troops and 
relations to civilians.95 These include ensuring transport for or control over troops on 
rotation, supervising the repayment of military debts to civilians, removing soldiers from 
civilian living areas and paying reparations to victims of military abuses, such as looting 
and theft.96 These are clear indications that many commanders have a basic sense of 
responsibility and feel an urge to engage in efforts to improve military functioning. Such 
existing “willingness for reform” among lower level commanders demonstrates that there is 
substantial scope for change, should the higher levels buy into it. 
 
Concluding Reflections: Breaking the Cycle of Military Integration and 
Disintegration 
 
An increasing amount of negotiated settlements to civil wars include provisions for military 
power-sharing, either through the merging or integration of ex-belligerents’ fighting forces. 
Contrary to other contexts where this policy was applied,97 in the DRC, the doors to the 
army were never closed after the initial merging, leading to a path of never-ending military 
integration. Intended as a policy to end armed group activity, when caught up in the 
convoluted and fragmented politico-military landscape of the DRC, the effects of military 
integration have been the opposite. Military integration has destabilized and weakened the 
Congolese army and fuelled conflict dynamics in the east.  At the same time, from the point 
of view of the DRC government, with its limited space to maneuver and weak capacities for 
implementation and pressure, this policy “made sense” as an instrument of cooptation and 
control. Furthermore, until recently, it was never flagged as a major issue by international 
actors engaged in the DRC. 
 
Yet, times seem to be changing. Both Congolese and international actors have 
started to show signs that military integration, as implemented up to now, is highly 
problematic, and that the policy needs to be either abandoned or drastically reformed. This 
opens up the question what donors could do in order to address this issue. As indicated in 
the paper, alternative ways of dealing with armed groups or managing military integration 
are possible. However, the scope for reform is seriously reduced by Kinshasa’s limited 
political space and capacity to implement military policies, the limited military capacity to 
put pressure on armed groups, and the limited “political will” in certain circles both among 
donors and the DRC government. Although these factors hinder policy changes, they do not 
render it impossible. 
 
We do not believe that externally driven social engineering is possible–let alone 
desirable–in the DRC, certainly not in the absence of massive flows of resources and 
political pressure. Nevertheless, we do believe that within the bounds of structured 
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contingency, interventions can, in certain circumstances, generate a momentum ultimately 
leading to somewhat different outcomes. Therefore, it is imperative that pending processes 
of military integration will be more actively and critically monitored and engaged with, if 
only to reduce potential negative effects. This could include conditionalities attached to 
military assistance. Equally crucial is a longer term commitment to provide the necessary 
resources. The implementation of vital measures aiming to mitigate the negative effects of 
military integration, and to stimulate viable alternatives to it, will doubtlessly require 
substantial resources over a longer period of time. 
 
Lastly, let us briefly turn back to the initial story of the integration of the first 
military of independent Congo, the ANC, from the mid-1960s onwards. If Mobutu succeeded 
in stabilizing a chaotic environment, forging a reasonably cohesive force and reinforcing the 
projection of central state power to the semi-autonomous social orders in the east, this did 
not go without massive corruption and co-optation in the ANC, systematic human rights 
violations, and the repression and elimination of dissidents. Perhaps this is the biggest 
challenge for donors engaged in the DRC: to contemplate how to reconcile the stabilization 
of the immensely fragmented and volatile east with army reform, while simultaneously 
foster respect for basic standards of human rights, accountability, democracy, and natural 
resources management. Although laudable, it is an open question in how far such an 
ambitious project is feasible, especially in the absence of far-reaching transformations in the 
nature of the Congolese state. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
 
ANC    Armée Nationale Congolaise  
CNDP    Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple 
DDR    Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
DRC    Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EUSEC-RD Congo Mission de conseil et d’assistance de l’Union européenne en 
matière de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en RD Congo 
FARDC   Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
FAZ    Forces Armées Zaïroises  
FDLR    Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda 
FRF    Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes 
MILOBS   Military Observers  
MLC               Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo 
MONUC Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République 
Démocratique du Congo 
MONUSCO   Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la  
    Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo 
PARECO   Patriotes Résistants Congolais 
RCD-G   Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma 
RCD-K/ML   Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – 
    Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération 
RCD-N   Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National 
SADC    Southern African Development Community 
SMI    Structure Militaire d’Integration 
SSR    Security Sector Reform 
UK    United Kingdom 
UN    United Nations 
 
 
